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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Nature of the Case: 
case is a personal injury arising out 
Complaint alleged per se violations of statute, strict liability, and negligence against the property 
owners and their tenants. The case involves the interpretation of Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) in 
addressing the liability of a property owner for iajuries suffered due to an attack and bite from a 
vicious dog that is housed on property. The Appellant, Whitney Bright ("Brighf') seeks to reverse 
the summary judgment ruling issued in favor of the Respondents, Roman and Natalya Mazniks 
("Mazniks" or "Landlord") on the basis that there were material issues of fact existing in the record 
upon which the juror fact finders could rely to find the Landlord liable for the injuries caused by the 
vicious dog. 
Bright contends that, by definition under Idaho Code § 25-2805(2), the dog o"'ner ··and the 
owner of the premises" on which the animal is housed, both have imposed on them a duty of 
responsibility resulting from an unprovoked attack by a vicious dog. There is no exception under 
the statute for lack of knowledge nor is there a requirement of a prior bite or attack. In fact, the 
statute details the further consequences of what happens on a "second or subsequent violation" so 
that it is clear that the first sentence of Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) applies to duties on the first attack 
of a vicious dog. Notwithstanding, the District Court ruled on summary judgment in favor of 
Mazniks following the theory that a vicious dog is allowed "one free bite" and holding that no duty 
attaches under the statute unless a prior incident clearly establishes a foreseeable harm. 
Bright further contends that conflicting evidence existed in the record between witnesses as 
to the vicious nature and dangerous propensities of the dog. Statements made by both the owners of 
the dog and the closest neighbor established that the dog was dangerous, intimidating, barked 
wildly, and lunged hard at the neighbor on its leash. was in con1:1ict with statements of the 
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Landlord's agent, who claimed that although the dog barked loudly when she picked up the rent 
month from the cv.uuu,0. she did not feel the dog was vicious. The conflicting statements 
evidence constitute material fact that should have prevented the case from 
determination at summary judgment and allowed the case to proceed to a jury trial. A jury should 
be allowed to weigh the material factual issues regarding knowledge of the dangerous and vicious 
propensities of the dog as against the owner of the premises, the Landlord. 
(ii) Course of Proceedings: 
Bright filed a Complaint on September 25, 2014, bringing her claim for personal injury 
damages resulting from a vicious dog attack against both the dog owner, and the Mazniks, as 
owners of the property where the vicious dog was housed. R. Vol. I, pp. 5-9. The Complaint 
alleged that the Mazniks had a duty under Canyon County Code and Nampa City Code to keep the 
dog restrained and controlled at all times, as well as causes of action for strict liability and 
negligence. R. Vol. I, pp. 5-9. The Complaint alleged that the Mazniks are the owners of the 
property harboring the dog with the vicious nature, disposition and propensity where the Mazniks 
knew of, or had reason to know of, the vicious nature of the dog. R. Vol. I, pp. 7-8. 
Bright filed her First Amended Complaint on May 20, 2015, to add the wife of the dog 
owner as a Defendant. R. Vol. I, p. 3 and R. Vol. I, pp. 97-102. The proceeding against Defendants 
James and Katherine Thomas ("Thomases"), the owners of the dog, proceeded through default and 
a Judgment for $25,000 was entered on March 24, 2016. R. Vol. I, p. 280. That Judgment against 
the dog owners, Thomases, is not at issue in this appeal. 
Mazniks filed an Answer to the Complaint and a demand for jury trial on November 10, 
2014. R. Vol. I, pp. 10-17. A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the Mazniks on April 
15, 2015, arguing that the Respondents do not have a statutory or common law duty with regard to 
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dog owned by the Thomases and further sought the dismissal of Mazniks as defendants in the 
case. R. Vol. I, pp. 20-21. 
Bright filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Summary Judgment 
on June 8, 2015 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 139-142) asserting Defendant Thomas' testimony and the testimony 
of the dog owners' closest neighbor, Janette Endecott ("Endecott") established that this dog was 
intimidating, dangerous, and known to be vicious. R. Vol. I, pp. 155 and 106-107. The 
Memorandum further sets out the facts showing that Mazniks, through their agent, had approved the 
Belgian Shepherd dog in the Residential Lease/Rental Agreement, and personally collected the rent 
from the tenants each month and had personally observed the dog's behavior and demeanor. R. 
Vol. I, p. 60, 78. Bright's Memorandum in Opposition of Summary Judgment asserted that: (i) this 
was a vicious dog by definition under Idaho Code § 25-2805(2); (ii) the Mazniks, through their 
agent, Ms. Neddo, had knowledge of, or should have known about the vicious nature of the dog; 
and (iii) therefore, under the statute, the Mazniks could be liable for the iajuries caused to by the 
dog. R. Vol. I, pp. 186-195. There is no statutory requirement that the dog must have a prior bite or 
attack for liability to attach under the clear language of Idaho Code § 25-2805(2). The statute 
further does not distinguish between whether the property owner is a landlord or an O'\\,Tier 
occupying the property. 
A hearing on the Summary Judgment Motion was conducted by the court on June 18, 2015, 
and the court issued its Memorandum Decision Upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on July, 17, 2015. R. Vol. I, p. 236-249. The court determined that an ambiguity existed in the 
statute which required the court to look to the reasonableness and the public policy behind the 
statute and legislative history. R. Vol. I, p. 240. The court held that because there was no evidence 
in the record that the Dog had physically attacked or otherwise bitten anyone prior to this incident, 
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court found that the Mazniks were entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw on Bright's negligence 
se, strict liability, and negligence -·-·UU~· 
(iii) Statement of Facts: 
The Mazniks are the owners of real property in Canyon County, Idaho, identified as 813 
Heartland Court, Nampa, Idaho (the "Property"). The Property includes a townhome unit that 
the Mazniks rented out through their property management agent, Cashflow Management. R. 
Vol. I, pp. 55-60. On January 21, 2014, the Defendants Thomases ("Thomases") jointly owned a 
large dog of the German or Belgium Shepherd breed ("the Dog"), which was approximately six 
and a half (6 Yz) years old. R. Vol. I, p. 98. Thomases lived with the Dog at their residence 
located at the Property. Thomases had actual knowledge that the Dog had violent propensities 
and was a danger to other persons. The Thomases did not keep the Dog reasonably and properly 
confined. R. Vol. I, p. 98. Mr. Thomas told the investigating police officer that the Dog had 
been "protective trained." R. Vol. I, p. 147. 
Mazniks, as owners of the Property wherein the Thomases resided, knew or should have 
known that the occupants of the residence were harboring the dangerous Dog. The Mazniks' 
knowledge and actions are as imputed from their property management agent, the principal of 
Cashflow Management, Trina Neddo (Ms. Neddo), who personally collected the rents each 
month from the tenants of the properties and had personally observed the viscous Dog on these 
occasions. Ms. Neddo testified to her agency with the property owners as follows: 
6 Q. Do you have any problem stating that anything 
7 you did in relation to Mr. Thomas, this case, anything 
8 you did or did not do was within the scope of your 
9 agency on behalf of Roman Maznik? 
10 A. Yes, I do. 
11 Q. Do you agree to that? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And do you agree that anything that was within 
14 your knowledge or not within your knowledge is also 
15 within the scope of your agency with Mr. Maznik? 
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16 A. Yes. 
Trina Neddo, pg 62, lines 6-16, Exh. Affidavit of Pope.) R. Vol. I, 78. 
Mazniks, through their agent, lease almost exclusively (approximately 90%) to 
tenants with pets and often to tenants with large dogs. (Depo. of Trina Neddo, pg 22, lines 16-
19, Exh. C, Affidavit of Pope.) R. Vol. I, p. 68. Their agent regulated the dogs of their tenants 
including the present dog owners, Thomases, by having them enter into a "Pet Agreement" 
which was attached to their lease and that required: (1) that the Dog be "kept under control at all 
times"; (2) that the Dog ''be restrained when it is outside"; (3) that the Dog should not cause any 
"annoyance of discomfort to others"; and (4) that "any damage" by the Dog should be 
immediately paid for. The Pet Agreement made the Mazniks aware the Thomases owned a large 
"Belgian Shepherd (40 lbs.)" R. Vol. I, p. 60. The Mazniks, through their agent, were further 
involved in prior pet investigations as evidenced by their responses to interrogatories that: 
"Defendants Roman Maznik and Natalya K. Maznik entrusted Cashflow Management to deal 
with all necessary measures to provide safe rental premises, including checking the breed of the 
pet and avoids leasing the property to the Tenant with aggressive breeds." R. Vol. I, p. 180. A 
Belgian Shepherd dog is the same breed that the U.S. Secret Service uses "to guard the grounds 
of the White House." R. Vol. I, p. 174. 
The Dog at issue in this case had no outside dog run or fenced yard and was kept in-doors 
constantly, except for occasional walks. As testified to by its mvners, the dog received no 
socialization outside its cooped up home such that "if anybody got within our radius he turned 
his hackles up and was on guard" meaning the dog ·'got into a stance where he is ready to jump 
on you .... " "He was scared. If someone came near us that he didn't know he responded like a 
scared animal would. He would bark." (Depo. of Katherine Thomas, pgs. 15-19, Exh. 3, Aff. of 












And how loud was the bark? 
He had a pretty bark. 
Was it what an person 
9 an intimidating bark? 
10 A. Yes. 






A. It's loud. And there is a dog standing there 
barking at you looking at you straight in the eye. To 
15 me that is intimidating. 
(Depo. of Katherine Thomas, pgs. 16-19, Exh. 3, Aff. of Bright.) R. Vol. I, pp. 154-155. 
Mr. Thomas told the investigating police officer that the Dog had been "protective trained." R. 
Vol. I, p. 147. 
A neighbor who was closest to the Property residence testified that: 
The residents of 813 Heartland Court, Nampa, Idaho have had in past 
years a large German Shepherd or similar Shepherd breed dog. After the 
residents of 813 moved in, the gentleman owner of the dog came over to my front 
door, introduced himself and said "this is not a friendly dog" and it is a "retired 
police dog." 
On more than one occasion when I was out working in the yard, and the 
neighbor would walk his large Shepherd dog to the mail box, the dog would bark 
wildly at me and lunge hard against its leash toward me. There was no question 
in my mind but that this was a vicious dog. 
(Affidavit of Janette Endecott). R. Vol. I, pp. 106-107. 
The Mazniks through their agent, had monthly contact with the vicious Dog because the 
property manager personally went to the Property each month and collected the rent in person: 
1 Q. How much contact did you have with Trina Neddo [Masnik's agent] 
2 or her husband from 2009 to September of2014 while you 








A. Monthly contact for rent pick up. And 
whenever there was an issue with any maintenance of the 
apartment. 
Q. Did you ever have Murphy, the dog, in the 
presence of Trina Neddo? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did she observe the dog? 
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11 A. I believe so. She had the opportunity to. 
12 Q. And did Murphy, the dog, bark wildly as you 
13 described in the presence of Trina Neddo? 
A. When she first came to the door, when anybody 
15 came to the door, he would. But I don't -- yeah, I 
16 believe I have answered that. 
17 Q. And did Trina Neddo come to the door on a 
18 monthly basis? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 
21 
Q. Collecting rent? 
A. Yes. 
22 Q. And would Murphy, the dog, be outside his 
23 kennel inside the house on those occasions? 
24 A. Yes. I believe. There were some times where 
25 he was in his kennel asleep when she came to the door. 
1 So I can't say for certain where he was all of the time 
2 whenever she came. 
3 Q. But there was some times when he was outside 
4 the secure enclosure of the kennel when she came? 
5 A. Yes. 
(Depo. of James Thomas, pg. 54-55, Exh. 4.) R. Vol. I, p. 167. 
Plaintiff Bright testified by affidavit and by deposition that she was attacked by the 
vicious Dog, without provocation, on the evening of January 21, 2014 when she approached the 
door of the Property: 
On the evening of January 21, 2014 at approx. 9:30 p.m., I approached the front 
door of 813 Heartland Ct., Nampa, ID, the residence of James R. Thomas. I was visiting 
for a business purpose to determine why Thomas was behind on vehicle payments and 
determining whether the vehicle should be repossessed. I knocked on the front door or 
rang the doorbell. The porch light came on. Thomas opened the door behind which was 
a large barking vicious dog. Thomas stepped back allowing the dog to charge out biting 
and tearing at my left elbow. I was on the walkway off the porch and turned to run but 
the dog then attacked and bit my upper leg. My only escape was to run inside the house. 
The viscous dog then began charging and biting at the door further intimidating me and 
causing excruciating fear as I hid in the house until the dog was finally subdued and 
removed. 
At no time did I take any action to provoke the vicious dog. In fact, before the door 
was opened, I had stepped back off the porch onto the sidewalk and away from the door. 
There was no screen door on the property at 813 Heartland Court. There was no secure 
enclosure at 813 Heartland Court to keep the vicious dog from escaping. There was no 
secure enclosure at 813 Heartland Court for which exit and entry of the vicious dog was 
controlled by the owner of the premises or owner of the vicious dog. 
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(Affidavit of Whitney Bright.) R. Vol. I, pp. 139-140. 
Bright was to hospital and treated her injuries. Bright incurred severe 
expenses. In addition, Bright is left 
with large permanent scars. R. Vol. I, p. 125. The subsequent police investigation revealed that 
the Dog had not had its rabies vaccination despite the fact that the Dog is over six years old. 
Subsequent to the attack, Thomases were required to quarantine the Dog. R. Vol. I, pp. 146-148. 
Eventually, the Dog was "put down." (Depo. of James Thomas, pp. 45-46.) R. Vol. I, pp. 164-
165. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court on Summary Judgment liberally construed all reasonable 
inferences and controverted facts in favor of the Plaintiff as required on summary 
judgment; 
2. Whether material issues of fact existed in the record upon which a fact-finder could have 
relied to find liability against the prope11y owner - landlord respondents; 
3. Whether the District Court erred by determining that the statutory language of Idaho 
Code § 25-2805(2) was ambiguous and required ·'one free bite" before attaching any 
liability for a vicious dog; and 
4. Whether the District Court erred in entering summary judgment against the Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Summary Judgment. 
When this Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment, it uses the same 
standard properly employed by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Carl H 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999). Summary 
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 870. "The record is construed in the 
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light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of 
party. reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, summary judgment is 
inappropriate. On appeal, this Court exercises review. Care 
Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 (Idaho 2001). 
B. Statutory Review. 
This Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts. 
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,474, 163 P.3d 1183. 1186 (2007). The primary function of the 
Court is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. Such intent should be derived from 
a reading of the whole act at issue. George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 
539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990). If the statutory language is unambiguous, "the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court 
to consider rules of statutory construction." Payette River Property Owners Assn. v. Board of 
Commrs. of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,557,976 P.2d 477,483 (1999). The plain meaning of 
a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless 
plain meaning leads to absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 
(2004). When a statute is ambiguous, the determination of the meaning of the statute and its 
application is also a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review. Kelso & Irwin, 
P.A. v. State Insur. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000); JR. Simplot Co. v. 
Western Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582,584, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). If it is necessary for 
this Court to interpret a statute, the Court will attempt to ascertain legislative intent, and in 
construing a statute, may examine the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed 
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. at 134, 997 P.2d at 595. 
To ascertain legislative intent the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but 
the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its 
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legislative history. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 
(2006). 
II. WITH THE SPECIFIC FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ALLOWED TO BE RESOLVED BY A JURY. 
A. The Evidence Existed in the Record That Mazniks Knew or Should Have 
Known That the Dog Was Vicious. 
The following is a summary of facts, viewed most favorably to Bright, that the property 
owners, Mazniks knew or should have known that the Dog was vicious: 
• Mazniks worked solely through their property managing agent who admitted that 
everything the agent knew or did was on behalf of Mazniks. R. Vol. I, p. 187. 
• Mazniks' property agent rents to nearly 90% pet owners in order to tap that 
market. R. Vol. I., p. 68. 
• Mazniks entered a "Pet Agreement" with the dog owners in this case granting 
permission to have a "Belgian Shepherd 40lbs." on the premises. R. Vol. I, p. 
60. 
• Mazniks' assumed a duty to screen out tenants with dogs of an aggressive breed. 
R. Vol. I, p. 180. 
• Mazniks failed through its agent's ordinary practice to investigate the Belgian 
Shepherd breed to find that it is a regularly used guard dog. A simple Internet 
search would have revealed the aggressive nature of this breed. R. Vol. I, p. 174. 
• The Dog was confined to the small home with no dog run or kennel and no 
socialization with others outside the home. R. Vol. I, pp. 154-155. 
• Mazniks through their agent, personally visited the home each month to pick up 
the rent payment and therein observed the confining conditions of the large Dog 
along with the wild barking and aggressive nature of the Dog. R. Vol. L p. 167. 
This is not the typical landlord-tenant relationship where the property owner does not 
know anything about the tenants' pets, has no pet agreement in the lease, and receives the mailed 
in rental payments never visiting the property. In that typical relationship it would make sense 
the court to that there are no on 
potential liability. However, in this case, Bright presented to the District Court the above 
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detailed substantial competent evidence upon which a jury could conclude that the property 
owners, Mazniks, knew or should have known of the vicious nature of the Dog. Bright asserts 
appeal that the District Court erred in failing to acknowledge those factual evidence 
and failing to view those items of evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
Bright. 
B. The Dog Fits the Definition of a Vicious Dog Pursuant to Idaho Code § 25-
2805(2) as His Attack was Unprovoked. 
The facts of this case clearly reveal that Bright was attacked by the Thomases' large Dog 
and that the attack was completely unprovoked. Bright simply rang that doorbell seeking the 
Defendant Thomas to inquire regarding a debt he owed. Without warning or provocation. 
Thomases' Belgian Shepherd pushed through the door and attacked Bright. Thomas was unable 
to contain the animal prior to, during, and after the attack. The vicious Dog was not contained in 
a "secure enclosure." The Dog was able to bite and tear two wounds into Bright's extremities 
before she was able beat the Dog with her clipboard to get it to release. Even then, the Dog ran 
through the front yard before Thomas could contain or gain control of the animal. 
Idaho Code§ 25-2805 (2) defines a vicious dog as "[a]ny dog which, when not physically 
provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not 
trespassing .... " Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) alerts both the dog owner and the "owner of the 
premises" on which the animal is housed that duty attaches to both for responsibility resulting 
from an unprovoked attack. 
There is no exception, under the statute, for lack of knowledge nor is there a requirement 
of a prior bite or attack. In fact the statute details the further consequence of what happens on a 
"second or subsequent violation" so that it is known that the first sentence of Idaho Code §25-
2805(2) applies to duties on the first attack of a vicious dog. 
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C. The District Court Erred in Holding that I.C. §25-2805(2) is Ambiguous. 
District determined because the parties disputed the required meaning of 
statute that an ambiguity existed within statute itself. 
Mazniks contended that the statute requires a previous un-provoked attack or bite before it is 
considered vicious under the statute, claiming that the Dog should be allowed "one free bite" 
before it can be considered vicious. Bright contended that it is irrelevant under the statute 
whether there has been a previous attack. The clear language of the statute provides the 
definition of "vicious" as a non-provoked attack, wound or bite that causes injury to a non-
trespasser. Nothing in the statute requires a preceding attack or bite in order to establish that the 
dog is vicious. The court determined that because the parties were proposing differing 
interpretations of the statute, the statute was ambiguous requiring the court to look to 
reasonableness and public policy arguments. 
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory construction 
is unnecessary, and this Court need only determine the application of the words to 
the facts of the case. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 Idaho 568, 572, 21 
P.3d 890, 894 (2001). A statute is ambiguous where the language is reasonably 
capable of more than one conflicting construction. Shruhs v. Protection Techs, 
Inc .. , 133 Idaho 715, 718, 992 P.2d 164, 167 (1999). However, "[a]mbiguity is 
not established merely because differing interpretations are presented to a court; 
otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered ambiguous." 
Hamilton, 135 Idaho at 572, 21 P.3d at 894. Therefore, "[t]he interpretation 
should begin with an examination of the literal words of the statute, and this 
language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning." Williamson v. 
City of McCall (In re Williamson), 135 Idaho 452, 455, 19 P.3d 766, 679 (2001). 
L & W Supply Corporation v. Chartrand Family Trust. 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 P.3d 97, 101 
(2002). 
The language of Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) is clear and unambiguous. The statute does 
not require a prior attack or bite to establish the vicious nature of a dog. The District Court erred 
by seeking extrinsic guidance from legislative history and other sources in this case. Reviewing 
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actual words in the statute make clear that the court misapplied the definition of "vicious" by 
~-·~·"·"' unnecessary elements that are not within meanmg the statute. 
District case James 
Boise, 158 Idaho 713, 351 P.3d 1171 (Idaho 2015) 1 to support its interpretation that LC.§ 25-
2805(2) follows the "one free bite" approach. The court's reliance on the James case was not 
appropriate as that case involved the issue of a law enforcement officer's liability under LC. § 
25-2805(2). The court in James determined that an officer was exempt under this statute for 
public policy reasons. The James case concerns an officer's qualified immunity in carrying out 
policy work decisions based on probable cause and very specific circumstances in the protection 
of the public. The comments made in this case regarding LC. § 25-2805(2) were set out to 
establish that the statute is inapplicable to law enforcement officers where specifically trained 
canines are used in police work. The decision did not set out the standards for applying LC. § 
25-2805(2) in non-law enforcement situations, nor does it stand for the policy that there must be 
a prior attack by the dog before liability can be imposed. 
D. Failure to Provide a Secure Enclosure Provided an Opportunity for an 
Unprovoked Attack. 
Stated in its entirety, LC. § 25-2805(2) clearly states that a property owner can be held 
responsible for the unprovoked attack of an animal housed on his/her property. Further, the 
Statute does not distinguish between whether the property owner is a landlord or an owner 
occupying the property. The Statute simply states the "owner of premises on which a vicious 
dog" is harbored. Section 2805(2) states as follows: 
Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites 
or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be 
unlawful for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is 
present to harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure 
1 A substitute opinion was subsequently entered by the Idaho Supreme Court on March 23, 2016. James v. City of 
Boise, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 83,376 P.3d 33 (Idaho 2016). 
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enclosure is one from which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and 
entry is controlled by the owner of the premises or owner of the animal. Any 
vicious dog removed from the secure enclosure must be restrained by a chain 
sufficient to control the vicious dog. Persons guilty of a violation of this 
subsection, and addition to any liability as provided in section 25-2806, Idaho 
Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. For a second or subsequent violation of 
the subsection, the court may, in the interest of public safety, order the owner to 
have the vicious dog destroyed or may direct the appropriate authorities to destroy 
the dog. 
Under the Statute, any vicious dog must be maintained in a secured enclosure, from which it 
cannot escape. Further, the animal must be restrained before it can be removed from the secured 
enclosure. 
In this matter, the Mazniks argue that they had no duty to protect Bright from an 
unprovoked attack. However, Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) imposes responsibility without requiring 
an analysis of duty. It is per se negligence as a violation of a statute. Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) 
imposes per se liability for failure to house a vicious dog in a secure and inescapable enclosure. 
This liability is imposed on the property owner. This liability likewise attaches on the first 
unprovoked attack. In other words, the Statute does not require that the property owner have 
knowledge of prior attacks. In fact, the Statute specifically states more severe penalties for a 
second attack. 
In this matter, the Mazniks through their agent knowingly rented an insufficiently 
equipped facility to a tenant with two dogs. The Property had no fence. The Property had no 
kennel or dog run. Further, the Property had no screen doors that could have at a minimum 
provided a protective barrier for invitees approaching the door to the Property. 
The Dog owned by the tenant was of a breed known to have protective and vicious 
propensities. The Dog had been "protective trained." Mazniks' own investigation should have 
revealed the type of dog it was. A simple Internet search would have revealed that this breed, 
Belgian Shepherd, is a guard dog used for security purposes even at the White House. The 
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Mazniks rely on their agent to vet out dogs with dangerous propensities, and they failed in this 
This information was relayed to the Mazniks through the Agreement wherein the 
and of the dogs were described. The Mazniks failure to provide a secure enclosure 
on the Property, while electing to rent to a tenant with not one but two dogs, one of which is a 
large breed known for its dangerous propensities, created an environment ripe for an unprovoked 
attack to result in an injury. Under LC. § 25-2805(2), the Mazniks must bear potential liability 
of the risk for their decision to rent an ill-equipped premise to a tenant with a large breed dog 
known to react viciously. Under LC. § 25-2805 (2), the Mazniks' potential liability for Ms. 
Bright's damages from the unprovoked attack should be allowed to be presented to a jury. 
E. Boswell v. Steele Distinguishes The Holding In Boots v. Winters Holding An 
Owner Accountable For An Unprovoked Dog Attack. 
The Respondents' reliance on Boots v. Winters 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct App. 
2008) for the proposition that a property owner has no premises liability for a vicious dog is 
misplaced. Idaho's Court of Appeals, as recently as April 2015, revisited the holding in Boots 
and distinguished the same in situations where a dog attacks without provocation. In the case of 
Boswell v. Steele, 2014 Ida. App. LEXIS 27, (Ct. App. 2015), the Court again considered the 
issue of an owners' premises liability for an unprovoked dog attack. Without defining whether 
harboring a vicious dog was a condition or an activity on the land, the Court determined that a 
property owner, with knowledge of an animal's dangerous propensities, that fails to warn is 
liable for damages from an unprovoked attacked. The Court recited the rules regarding premises 
liability as follows: 
The duty owed by O\vners and possessors of land depends on the status of the 
person injured on the land--that is, whether he or she is an invitee, licensee, or 
trespasser. Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 
(2012); Robinson v. Mueller. 156 Idaho 237. 239-40. 322 P.3d 319, 321-22 (Ct. 
App. 2014). An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a 
purpose connected with the business conducted on or it can 
reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary, or 
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other tangible benefit to the landowner. Holzheimer v. Johannesen. 125 Idaho 
397, 400. 871 P.2d 814. 817 (1994). A landowner owes an invitee the duty to 
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn of hidden or 
concealed dangers. Id. licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of 
another with the consent of the landowner in pursuit the visitor's purpose. Id: 
Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,401. 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct. App. 1987). Likewise, 
a social guest is also a licensee. Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. 
The duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only required to share with 
the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land. Evans~ 
112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. 
2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 27, * 15 (Ct. App. 2015). Ultimately, under the facts of the Boswell case, 
the homeowner was held liable for the unprovoked attack of her terrier on an invitee who had 
been to the home on several occasions. The Court found her liable despite her warning signs 
posted on her fence warning others to beware of the dog. 
In this matter, the Mazniks cannot hide under the cloak of ignorance as to the dog or its 
vicious propensities. As noted above, the Mazniks were well aware that their property did not 
contain a secure enclosure. Further, they were well aware from the Pet Agreement that the 
tenants they elected to rent to had not one but two dogs; one of which was clearly a large breed 
with dangerous and protective tenancies. 
F. The Evidence of the Vicious Propensities of the Dog Involved a Material 
Issue of Fact That Was Not Appropriate for Summary Judgment. 
The District Court determined that the Mazniks were entitled to summary judgment on 
the claim for liability for domestic animals because there was no evidence in the record that the 
Dog had physically attacked or otherwise bitten anyone prior to the attack on Bright. However, 
there was evidence in the record (1) that: Thomases believed the Dog to be intimidating (R. Vol. 
I, p. 155); (2) that their closest neighbor, Janette Endecott, had personally observed the Dog on 
several occasions and stated "the dog would bark wildly at me and lunged hard against its leash 
toward me" and "[t]here was no question in my mind but that this was a vicious dog" (R. Vol. L 
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107); and (3) that Mr. Thomas had introduced himself to his neighbor, and explained that the 
not a friendly dog" (R. Vol. L p. l 06-107). 
evidence of the vicious nature of an animal is not limited to the existence of a prior 
attack. Observations of the Dog's behaviors from the owners and neighbors should have been 
provided to a jury to enable a weighing of the evidence to determine this issue. Carl H 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999). Summary 
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Christensen Family Trust at 870. "The 
record is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable 
inferences are drawn in favor of that party. If reasonable minds might come to different 
conclusions, summary judgment is inappropriate." Hayward at 819. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Ms. Bright respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
District Court's judgment dismissing Ms. Bright's Complaint as to Mr. and Mrs. Maznik and 
order that the First Amended Complaint be allowed with a full trial on the issues of fact. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2016. 
EV ANS KEANE LLP 
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